Measuring Pay-Conversation Effectiveness Using Organizational Justice in a Fortune 100 Organization by Gloger, Christoph
Louisiana Tech University 
Louisiana Tech Digital Commons 
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 
Summer 8-2020 
Measuring Pay-Conversation Effectiveness Using Organizational 
Justice in a Fortune 100 Organization 
Christoph Gloger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations 
MEASURING PAY-CONVERSATION EFFECTIVENESS  
USING ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN A  
FORTUNE 100 ORGANIZATION 
by 







A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree  










COLLEGE OF EDUCATION 















This study draws from the pay-communication and organizational-justice 
literature to evaluate the effectiveness of manager/employee pay conversations in a large, 
North-American insurance company. Collecting survey data from 2230 randomly chosen 
employees across all managerial levels, tenure, and age groups it has been found that pay 
conversation quality, assessed by measuring the extent which specific, recommended 
content was addressed, and best-practice recommendations were followed, affects 
perceptions of procedural and informational justice, controlling for distributive justice.  A 
higher-order composite of the justice dimension was also positively related to the 
organization’s definition of employee engagement and turnover intentions.  The study’s 
implication for organizational practice, recommendations around effective messaging, as 
well as existing limitations, are discussed.
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With an ever-accelerating pace and increased complexity of business 
environments, organizations increasingly separate themselves from each other through 
the ability to continuously change and improve processes (Teece, 2007).  Component of 
the efforts to improve is a constant evaluation of existing processes, not only concerning 




The following study has been completed for a large, North-American company in 
the insurance industry, with about 45,000 employees across the family of companies 
based in the Midwest of the United States.  The majority of employees are located in the 
United States.  While the enterprise has subsidiaries in other countries and regions, only 




Every year, the organization adjusts the individual base compensation of 
employees based on overall organizational results and individual employee performance.  
How much of an increase each employee receives is mostly under the discretion of the 
specific departments and teams and is administered through managers to employees  




directly, within boundaries and rules set by the corporate compensation department in 
conjunction with the organization’s senior leadership.  Boundaries were set using salary-
band ranges that provided managers with soft targets when deciding annual base-pay 
increases.  Soft, because managers could exceed suggested limits if they felt the 
employee was deserving of a higher than suggested base pay based on her or his value to 
the organization.  This flexibility allowed managers to individualize their employees’ 
increase based on the individual situation and factors.  Once a decision was made, 
managers turn to communicate the base increase to the employee via a personal one-on-
one conversation that summarizes the past accomplishments to link the increase with the 
work completed through the past year.  
For the 2019 increase cycle, the organization decided to change some of the 
factors of this process.  First, salary-band ranges, a metric that provided managers with 
information on an employee’s compensation relative to other employees within the same 
salary band, were replaced by market ranges as the prominent metric for pay-decisions.  
Salary-band ranges continue to be used as the minimum and maximum pay allowed 
within a specific salary band.  Market ranges, shift the comparison group from employees 
within a specific salary band within the organization to employees with similar job duties 
within the specific (external) job market.  The shift provides more control to managers to 
make compensation decisions consistent with the organization's pay philosophy.  To 
obtain market ranges, the compensation department matches internal jobs with external 
information, usually provided by compensation surveys from significant management 




Second, the market-range information moved from a soft to a hard target, 
meaning that the limits set by the organization are now binding limits that cannot be 
surpassed or fallen short.  Managers with employees below target are recommended to 
provide more substantial increases to drive employee’s compensation to be more 
competitive to market over time.  On the flip side, employees with base compensation 
above the target become ineligible for an increase.  
From these changes arose an additional need for managers to communicate their 
decisions in more detail.  On the one hand, employee conversations could be more 
favorable with employees that received a more substantial increase than expected because 
they were below or at the lower end of the target.  On the other hand, employees that 
exceeded, or were close to the upper end of the target were in need for a more significant 
explanation of why their increase was smaller than expected, or why they would not get 
an increase at all.  The compensation department provided a comprehensive package of 
recommended topics and best practices, and information for managers to prepare them 
for these, at times, painful discussions.  Additionally, to increase transparency, employees 
were informed on their base-compensation facts, including their market-range percentile 











Original Evaluation Request 
 
The new facets of the compensation system resulted in an increased emphasis on 
the manager/employee conversation to communicate the changes to employees and to 
explain potential consequences to individual employees’ merit increases.  The research 
project at hand started in January 2019 with the request to evaluate the quality of 
manager/employee conversations with their employees via a survey to a subset of the 
organization.  More specifically, the project aimed to discover whether managers do a 
good job explaining the changes in a way that resonates positively with their subordinates 
(i.e., fosters change acceptance).  The compensation department additionally conducted a 
yearly survey that evaluates the quality of guiding materials and whether managers 
perceive the support as adequate and helpful when planning and deciding annual merit 
increases.  An effective merit-increase process requires managers that understand the 
system and the guardrails in place that give them leeway to make decisions.  A 
comprehensive set of materials form the foundation to ensure that managers feel fully 
supported and are equipped with the information to make decisions in the best interest of 
the organization.  The two surveys, in combination, would provide the capability for the 




Expanding the Scope 
 
 Upon initial conversation between the author of this document and the client, a 
plan was drafted that would address the questions initially raised.  Due to the familiarity 
of the author with the underlying concepts of pay communication and compensation, an 
approach was presented to the client that would expand the scope from an evaluation – 
based approach (“how are we doing? Do we have a problem?”)  to an impact-based 
approach (“Does our program impact employees as intended”).  Two central arguments 
served as a reason to look at the initial question from a different perspective.  First, an 
impact-based approach evaluates the effectiveness of a program against organizational 
outcomes such as employee engagement and intention to stay with the organization.  
Second, given the sensitive nature of compensation for the employee-organization 
relationship, the impact-based approach focuses on the effect of the initiative on 
employees rather than the actions are taken themselves. 
Generally, Human Resources makes increasing attempts to better quantify their 
services by measuring the impact of an initiative on the business, rather than solely 
analyzing individual components (e.g., participant satisfaction to a training module). In 
essence, measuring whether managers do a good job conveying and explaining the 
changes to employees is essential. Still, it does not tell us anything about employees’ 
reaction to the explanation itself.  Kirkpatrick (1994) describes a blueprint for the 
evaluation of training along four distinct levels: Reaction, Learning, Behavior, and 
Results.  While this is a widely known framework in the training-space, the framework 
can also be successfully applied to program-evaluation itself.  Analog to Kirkpatrick’s 




whereas measuring manager's successful behaviors would constitute a Level-3 
evaluation.  Both pieces of information are of importance to the organization.  Level-3 
information helps decision-makers to identify shortcomings but won’t provide 
information about whether the initiative or process is overall successful.  A Level-4 
measurement would be required to find a conclusive answer to that question.  The lack of 
a Level-4 objective in the initial request would have been a shortcoming that would have 




As described in the expanded scope section, the central question to be answered is 
whether manager/employee conversations have the intended main effect on employees, 
that is, provide an explanation for the base-pay increase decision that is satisfactory to the 
employee.  As described in the upcoming literature review, compensation is a delicate 
matter for employees because it is at the heart of the employee-employer relationship.  
Changes to compensation are often highly scrutinized, and decisions that are perceived as 
unjust or unfair may damage the relationship beyond repair.  The importance of the 
manager/employee conversations increases as the favorability of the decision for the 
employee decreases.  An explanation of the results and procedures employed to make 
decisions provides employees with reference points that put decisions in context and, 
conversely, may positively influence employees’ perceptions of being treated fairly.  If 
managers fail to be effective communicators, the results for the organization could be 
lowered engagement and heightened turnover as employees cope with their negative 





 Project Question 1a: Are manager/employee conversations effective in improving 
employee’s perception of fairness? 
 Project Question 1b: Provided that the conversations are indeed effective in 
improving employees’ perceptions of fairness, do employees who indicated better 
conversations and higher satisfaction also display higher engagement and intend-
to-stay results in the enterprise-wide engagement survey? 
Another objective involves managers conveying the changes to the compensation 
guidelines and the impact on employees in an understandable manner.  That includes 
providing and explaining tangible compensation information such as new salary and 
individual employee market ranges.  The organization hypothesizes that detailed change 
explanations will have positive effects on how likely employees deem the base-pay 
decision as satisfactory.  To support managers, the organization provides a set of 
recommended topics and best practices to focus on the manager/employee conversation.  
Managers are recommended to explain the total compensation package, cover the new 
market-range metric, how it is derived, how it is being used, and the impact of the metric 
as a guardrail for pay-increase decisions.  Additionally, the compensation department 
recommended that managers jointly review an employee’s contribution through the past 
year, but put the contributions in context to the base-pay decision, and leave room for the 
employee to ask questions.  The compensation department is interested in the 
effectiveness of these best practices in providing necessary information and in improving 





 Project Question 2: Do employees understand the changes to the compensation 
guidelines communicated through their managers? 
 Project Question 3: How effective are the provided best practices in influencing 
employee’s evaluation of the process and the information they receive? 
The author recommended an approach to answer these questions sufficiently, 
which is based on the current literature in the field of pay communication. This approach 












Compensation is physical or mental labor in exchange for monetary or non-
monetary rewards.  This transactional relationship is the heart of most employment 
agreements between individuals and organizations.  Salaries, wages, and benefits are the 
most critical outputs that organizations deliver to employees.  They accomplish a plethora 
of secondary functions, besides just fulfilling the transactional component of the 
agreement mentioned above, such as the communication of value, recognition, directing 
and motivating desirable (for the organization) behaviors, and rewarding performance 
(Berger & Berger, 2008).  The importance of compensation as a factor and component to 
overall organizational effectiveness through the attraction, motivation, and retention of 
employees has often been labeled critical for organizations.  Consequently, effective 
compensation systems can be a real competitive advantage (Gerhart, 2000; Guest, 2011).  
From an employee perspective, compensation is also a critical job factor (Gerhart & 
Rynes, 2003) that represents the primary exchange medium for the labor or human capital 
provided (Andersson-Straberg, Sverke, & Hellgren, 2007; Lawler, 2000), a form of 
recognition (Berger & Berger, 2008), a part of the performance management and 






Given the importance of compensation for organizations and employees alike, it is 
essential to understand how employees form perceptions of equitable compensation and 
how these perceptions may influence behavior.  The literature around equity theory, 
organizational justice perceptions, and pay communication can be used to understand the 
effects of the change on the workforce from an industrial/organizational psychology 
perspective. 
 




Equity theory (Adams, 1965) plays a foundational role in the compensation 
literature (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010).  Its theoretical foundation is 
derived from social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960).  Social Exchange 
theory posits that relationships and exchanges are formed and negotiated by individual 
cost-benefit analyses.  Additionally, equity theory was influenced by cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) that states that individuals drive to achieve 
consistency between their attitudes and behaviors.  The dissonance between actions and 
behaviors will result in action by the individual aimed to restore balance and consistency.  
Finally, equity theory asserts that every individual employee continuously 
compares his or her inputs such as education, effort, time spent, labor, performance, and 
loyalty to the respective organizational outcomes such as compensation, promotion 
opportunities, social relationships, and recognition (Day, 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010).  Those comparisons, however, cannot be made in a vacuum.  Employees cannot 
compare their inputs and outputs to themselves.  Instead, employees use referent others 





their situation.  When employees perceive the balance (or ratio) between individual 
inputs and outputs to be equal to the inputs and outputs of their respective referent others, 
the employee feels equity.  The relationship is demonstrated by the equation depicted in 
Figure 1a. 
 







 Any perceived imbalance would consequently be labeled inequity, as depicted in 
Figure 1b. It is essential to point out that inequity does not automatically have negative 
consequences.  It can be positive or negative.  An employee who just learned that he is 
being compensated twenty-five percent more than his colleague while performing similar 
tasks at similar quality and quantity perceives negative inequity (being over rewarded). In 
contrast, a colleague who receives twenty-five percent less for the same work as their 
comparison colleague experiences positive inequity (under-rewarded), should he or she 
get to learn of the pay gap (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001).  This example assumes that both 
parties involved do the same job, at the same quality, and that the 25 percent difference is 













It is the subjective assessment of the individual that matters more than the 
objective information, regardless of erroneous assumptions, or incomplete information 
that led to false conclusions.  Perceived and objective equity rarely fit together neatly.  
Employees differ significantly in the use and weighing of input and output criteria used 
for their comparison.  As a result, employees tend to overemphasize their strengths over 
weaknesses and how both form collective employee inputs (Lawler, 1966).  In 
combination with a general overestimation of own performance and achievements over 
that of peers and colleagues, perceived negative inequity is an outcome that is more likely 
(Kane & Lawler, 1979).  Milkovich and Newman (2005) emphasize that money, with its 
centrality mentioned above to the employer-employee relationship, usually plays a vital 
role in the equation of inputs, outputs, and referent – other comparisons.  When 
comparing outputs, or gain, employees usually base most of their evaluation on the 
comparison of compensation to their peers and coworkers.  Other factors, such as 
preferential treatment by superiors, better standing within the organization, and other, 





If positive inequity is perceived as the outcome of the referent-other comparison, 
the employee will try to restore balance.  That can be achieved through the following 
options: Either equity can be restored by reducing inputs (e.g., by withdrawal, 
absenteeism, reduced effort), trying to maximize the outputs (e.g., by complaining to a 
supervisor, asking for a raise, concerted actions), or by looking for other employment 
opportunities (Fisher, Schoenfeldt, & Shaw, 1999) with more favorable equity 
evaluations.  Some employees may even resort to deviant behaviors such as stealing or 
sabotaging as a consequence when equity is unlikely to be restored, and other options are 
scarce (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).  Perceived negative inequity (a feeling of being over 
rewarded), conversely, is less common, and outcomes are less severe because the 
employee is directly benefitting from the inequity.  Often, employees that feel negative 
inequity either perceive their performance to be higher and locus of control to be greater 
in comparison to colleagues (Thierry, 1998).  However, employees may also feel guilt or 
anxiety (Homans, 1961; Jaques, 1961). 
Fairness 
 
While equity theory aids the understanding of motivational effects of pay 
communication, it does not go far enough to explore the attitudinal dimension of 
employees.  It is essential to connect individual equity evaluations with resulting 
perceptions of fairness to understand the effects of pay communication on employee 
attitudes.  Equity theory explained that fairness is determined by relative evaluations of 
one’s input and outcomes in comparison to referent others (Adams, 1965). This theorem 
gives rise to more specific theoretical frameworks that explain the subsequent evaluations 





and, in sum, the organization.  Two concepts, uncertainty reduction theory (Lind & Van 
den Bos, 2002), also sometimes referred to as fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001), and 
organizational justice (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001) are crucial 
components in understanding effects of compensation on employee behavior. 
 At its heart, uncertainty reduction theory describes mental shortcuts, heuristics, 
that individuals utilize to cope with the absence of crucial information to make evaluative 
judgments (Lind & Van den Bos, 2001).  The more uncertain a situation, the more crucial 
information is missing to base judgments upon, and the more individuals seem to rely on 
the use of mental shortcuts.  Lind and Van den Bos (2002) argue that fairness is 
particularly important in uncertain situations because being treated fairly induces 
confidence in good outcomes while the opposite amplifies feelings of uneasiness.  As 
such, fairness perceptions direct an individual’s affective reaction in situations of 
uncertainty.  Restricting the flow of information concerning compensation introduces 
various degrees of uncertainty to the environment and, thus, forces individuals to rely on 
their shortcuts, heuristics, and ultimately fairness perceptions of the organization to 
inform critical judgments of their equity evaluation.  In most privately-owned 
organizations, compensation information is restricted to employees in some form.  
Restrictions may range from complete secrecy, where employees only know their 
compensation but are generally not aware of the factors that go into it and are either 
actively or passively encouraged not to share information to complete openness, where 
organizations may choose to communicate as much compensation information as legally 
possible.  Most organizations fall somewhere in between this range, making some 







Uncertainty reduction theory helps to understand the importance of fairness 
perceptions.  It does, however, very little to illuminate fairness perceptions as a construct, 
which is of critical importance to explore the consequences of such evaluations.  
Organizational justice represents a more fine-grained approach that describes fairness 
perceptions in more detail while trying to interpret and explain the impact of perceptions 
in organizational settings (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1990b).  Over the years, the field of 
organizational justice has seen a substantial amount of research and has grown from a 
unidimensional theory to a multidimensional construct with four distinct dimensions 
(Colquitt, 2012):  
 Distributive Justice (Adams, 1965), fairness perceptions associated with outcomes, 
 Procedural Justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), fairness perceptions associated with 
the process that lead to the outcomes, 
 Informational Justice (Bies & Moag, 1986), fairness perceptions associated with 
the information provided, 
 Interpersonal justice ((Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1990a, 1993), fairness 
perceptions associated with the interpersonal treatment.  
Generally, the link between justice perceptions and individual employee outcomes 
and attitudes are complementary.  Employees who feel treated fairly and equitably will 
subsequently have more positive attitudes towards the organization and, thus, are more 
likely to be more compliant and behave in manners benefiting the collective of the 
organization (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).  Conversely, unfavorable evaluations of 





characterized by a lack of cooperation and by selfishness (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 
2001).  To understand how pay-communication impacts the organization, a deeper 
understanding of the organizational justice construct is warranted.  It provides a vital link 
between practice (degree of pay communication) and organizational outcome (Marasi, 
2014).  The work will explain the four dimensions of organizational justice to gain a 
deeper understanding of organizational justice; then, their impact to pay communication 
will be discussed. 
Distributive Justice 
 
The perception of being compensated or rewarded fairly (in comparison to others) 
is referred to as distributive justice.  The concept is derived from Adam’s equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), discussed above.  Hence, people are concerned with the subjective, 
relative fairness of the allocated rewards more than they are concerned with the absolute 
level of rewards.  While Adam’s proposed the equity allocation principle as the basis of 
fairness evaluations, other researchers, most notably Leventhal (1976), proposed other 
potential principles based on “equality” and “need.”  Different contexts (family, work, 
society), goals (maximum performance, group harmony), or motives (self-interest, 
altruism) seem to activate different allocations principles within the individual and 
subsequently change the perception of distributive justice accordingly (Colquitt et al., 
2001; Deutsch, 1975). 
Additionally, Gilliland (1993) noted that individuals might use different allocation 
principles within the same context.  Despite the sense of objectivity that these allocation 
principles evoke, the evaluation of whether an outcome is perceived as fair is a subjective 





measures to collect individual perceptions because they cannot be inferred from other 
variables with certainty.   
Procedural Justice 
Distributive justice is only one facet of a multidimensional construct 
(organizational justice) that is comprised of three additional facets, namely procedural, 
informational, and interpersonal justice (Colquitt, 2012; Colquitt et al., 2001).  Having its 
origins in the field of legal proceedings, Thibaut and Walker (1975) first described 
procedural justice as process control while explaining the positive effects of arbitration 
and mediation.  Individuals were willing to give up control over the outcome of a 
procedure as long as they had the means to influence the procedure itself.  This effect is 
also known as “fair process” or “voice” and has been frequently researched (e.g., Folger, 
1977; Lind & Tyler, 1988).  Leventhal subsequently applied the lessons learned in the 
field of litigation to an organizational setting (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & 
Fry, 1980). As a result, Leventhal developed six criteria that should be met for a 
procedure to be perceived as fair.  Procedures should: 
 Be applied consistently across all individuals and time 
 Be free of bias and vested interest in a particular outcome 
 Ensure that the information used for decision making is accurate 
 Include a method to complain about, appeal, or correct flawed or wrong decisions 
 Be in accordance with personal or universal standards of ethics and morals 






Adherence to the guideline of procedural justice is believed to coincide with a 
multitude of positive outcomes on the individual and organizational level such as 
increased satisfaction, higher acceptance of rules (e.g., Tyler & Bies, 1990; Tyler & 
Folger, 1980), increased satisfaction with results (e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989; 
LaTour, 1978; Lind, Walker, Kurtz, Musante, & Thibaut, 1980), and increased 
citizenship behaviors (e.g., Fahr, Podsakoff, & Organ, 1990; Kamdar, McAllister, & 
Turban, 2006; Moorman, Niehoff, & Organ, 1993; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; Zeinabadi & 
Salehi, 2011). 
Informational and Interpersonal Justice 
The most recent advance in the justice literature was introduced by Bies and 
Moag (1986) through the addition of the final components, informational and 
interpersonal justice.  The focus of these dimensions is the quality of social interactions 
between the individual and the organization or its representatives (supervisors, etc.) that 
can shape justice perceptions.  It should be noted that the exact labeling of these 
dimensions is subject to an ongoing academic debate.  Bies and Moag (1986) introduced 
informational and interpersonal justice as one dimension labeled interactional justice.  
Greenberg (1990a) subsequently split interactional justice into an explanation and 
sensitivity component, which was later re-labeled interpersonal and informational justice 
(Greenberg, 1993).  Due to its proximity to procedural justice, it was long debated 
whether informational and interpersonal justice are a standalone facet or just separate 
sub-facets of procedural justice (e.g., Aquino, 1995; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; 
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).  Recent work by Colquitt (2001) indicates a preference for 





and informational justice.  Thus, the author of this work preferred to use informational 
and interpersonal justice as separate dimensions. 
Bies and Moag (1986) formerly comprised the construct of four criteria: 
justification: truthfulness, respect, and propriety.  Justification refers to how adequately a 
particular outcome was explained, while truthfulness describes the accuracy and honesty 
of the justification.  Employees that are given an accurate, timely, and complete 
explanation of procedures and outcomes are more likely to view them as fair (Andersson-
Straberg et al., 2007).  Respect refers to whether the individual was treated with dignity 
and sincerity, and propriety suggests that the presentation of outcomes or procedures is 
free of biases, prejudicial statements, and based on accurate information (Scott, Colquitt, 
& Zapata-Phelan, 2007).  Greenberg’s (1993) split follows the four criteria by Bies and 
Moag (1986) by including respect and propriety in the interpersonal category, and 
justification and truthfulness in the informational category (Greenberg, 1993).  More 
information on the linkages in section 3.3.3. 
Outcomes of Types of Organizational Justice 
 
Organizational research over the last decades has firmly established 
organizational justice as an essential mechanism through which necessary employee 
attitudes are formed.  Most notably, Colquitt et al. (2001) conducted a meta-analytic 
review that included 183 studies between 1975 and 1999.  Results firmly relate the four 
dimensions of organizational justice to critical organizational outcomes such as job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, performance, organizational citizenship 
behaviors, and withdrawal, among others.  Additionally, it is one of several antecedents 





Tur, Ramos, Peiró, & Cropanzano, 2008; Saks, 2006).  Before the role of organizational 
justice for this study is discussed in detail, it is important to introduce pay communication 






Pay communication, or pay secrecy which it was often referred to, was viewed by 
early literature as an organizational practice that aimed to restrict the amount of 
information employees could potentially access about the compensation of coworkers 
(Burroughs, 1982; Colella, Paetzold, Zardkoohi, & Wesson, 2007; Thompson & Pronsky, 
1975).  As Marasi and Bennett (2016) pointed out, pay secrecy was treated like an “all-
or-nothing” type of concept.  Either organization employed a policy of total secrecy or 
complete openness.  This labeling does not do justice to the complexity of the construct. 
Hence, the term pay communication is predominantly used nowadays, which treats 
complete secrecy and openness as two extreme ends of a continuum.  The paradigm shift 
accurately reflects organizational practice as the use and degree of pay secrecy policies 
vary widely from employer to employer (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Milkovich & 
Newman, 2005).  To one end, pay secrecy, as discussed earlier, aims at prohibiting 
employees from discussing aspects of their compensation amongst themselves as well as 
to outsiders.  In this regard, it is essential to notice that neither the organization is actively 
communicating compensation-relevant information, nor are employees permitted to 
communicate their salary to others.  The result is near-zero communication and no 





allow employees to disclose their individual information, the organization proactively 
discloses pay information in regular intervals (Marasi, 2014). 
Substantiated Outcomes of Pay Communication 
 
 Pay communication has a mixed track record of clearly substantiated results.  One 
of the first scholars to extensively investigate pay communication, or pay secrecy, which 
it was called at that time, was Lawler III.  Beginning with a series of studies in 1965 and 
1966 (Lawler, 1965a; Lawler, 1965b; Lawler, 1966), Lawler focused initially on the 
effects of pay secrecy policies on the accuracy of referent-other comparisons of lower- 
and middle-level managers.  Results demonstrated that managers in both public and 
private sectors consistently overestimated the pay of subordinates and peers.  Public 
sector managers were more accurate in their comparisons, which, according to Lawler 
(Lawler, 1965a; Lawler, 1965b), can be explained with the increased amount of salary 
information public managers have to their disposal compared to the private sector 
organizations.  The study demonstrated that the absence of tangible information increases 
the likelihood of inaccurate pay estimations that, in turn, produce inaccurate referent-
other comparisons.  The result is perceived pay compression for managers (since they 
overestimate the compensation of their subordinates and peers) that leads to paying 
dissatisfaction and subsequently, according to Lawler (1965a), reduced motivation to 
perform and to be promoted. 
Lawler was able to replicate his results in a follow-up study (Lawler, 1967) with 
varying research design.  Milkovich and Anderson (1972) executed a similar study in an 
organization that utilized a less restrictive pay communication strategy (in comparison to 





managerial information was available and found similar results.  In an additional follow-
up study, Lawler (1972) additionally incorporated theoretical foundations (e.g., social 
comparison theory, equity theory) for hypothesis building and interpretation.  While the 
same over/underestimation pattern was once again observed, pay satisfaction was 
affected by peer and subordinate pay overestimation. Contrary to results Lawler obtained 
from previous studies (Lawler, 1967). 
Moreover, pay satisfaction was negatively related to the accuracy of pay 
estimations, self/other pay differentials, and perceived standing in the organization 
relative to others.  Lawler (1972) also uncovered that Managers consistently 
overestimated superiors’ size and frequency of pay raises and largely ignored their own, 
individual pay raise characteristics.  Effects of the erroneous estimation reach beyond 
equity evaluations. Since pay raises are often tied to performance feedback, especially in 
organizations with a stronger emphasis on pay-for-performance, managers who 
overestimated their superior's raises interpreted their performance feedback as more 
negative.  Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) were able to observe similar results in their 
replication of Lawler’s (1972) study.   
Pay Communication, Organizational Justice  
Perceptions and Organizational Outcomes 
 
In 2007, Colella et al. (2007) reviewed the state of the pay communication 
literature that summarized cost, benefits, and tradeoffs for organizations that employ pay 
secrecy.  Among the benefits are greater organizational control to maintain a workplace 
free of conflict, enhanced privacy for employees, and lowered risk of turnover due to 
compensation.  The costs of such a policy are lowered perceptions of fairness, decreased 





market inefficiencies.  One of the costs associated with pay secrecy described by Colella 
et al. (2007), decreased task motivation, was not substantiated through empirical research 
at the time of the publication and, thus, only a hypothesis.  Bamberger and Belogolovsky 
(2010) generated and tested a moderated-mediation model aimed to explore the validity 
of the proposed adverse effects of pay secrecy policies on individual task performance 









Results of the experimental study using undergraduate students revealed no direct 
effect of pay communication on task performance.  However, tolerance for inequity did 
moderate the relationship mentioned above in the expected fashion as individuals with 
lower tolerance experienced more negative effects on task performance in a pay secrecy 





pay communication and task performance when tolerance for inequity was included as a 
moderator.  Hence, the study demonstrated the adverse effects specific pay 
communication strategies might have for certain populations. 
The non-significant findings of the mediating effects of procedural and 
informational fairness on task performance were surprising, given the meta-analytic 
findings of Colquitt et al. (2001).  Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) explained the 
results with an overpowering effect of instrumentality perceptions in explaining the 
already low variance in task performance.  Thus, given the sample size of the study and 
the experimental conditions, the results do not indicate that these types of justice 
perceptions may be excluded from future research, given the numerous limitations of the 
study (e.g., participants compensation was too low to cause meaningful justice reactions 
for participants).  Allocation of the already limited rewards was based on an objectively 
measured performance metric that ensured maximum pay-for-performance allocation 
validity.  Given the issues organizations and scientists experience with performance 
measurement alike due to the numerous contextual factors (Pulakos & O’Leary, 2011), 
one can reasonably expect a more significant role of justice perceptions in real-world, 
organizational settings where resource allocation is imperfect.  On top of that, the 
interaction between participants in this simulation (two hours) may not have been enough 
for the development of realistic coworker dynamics that are the basis for the referent-
other comparisons. 
Building on the work of Noy (2007), Colella et al. (2007), and Bamberger and 
Belogolovsky (2010), Marasi’s study aimed to explore the effects of pay communication 





pay secrecy fosters erroneous referent-other comparisons as accurate information upon 
which to base-pay estimations is unavailable.  Since employees tend to overestimate 
peer-level compensation, an escalation of feelings of unfairness and negative emotions 
becomes more likely.  Coupled with the uncertainty that arises when information is being 
withheld because it is “secret,” employees are hypothesized to use workplace deviance as 
a method to offset or retaliate against the negative emotions created by the environment.  
Since this relationship is partially based on fairness perceptions, Marasi (2014) included 
organizational justice dimensions and perceptions of organizational and managerial trust 









Results of the study indicated significance for the pay communication, justice 





perceptions of trust, managerial trust significantly mediated the pay communication 
deviance relationship while organizational trust did not.  This study establishes 
organizational justice as a key mediator in the pay-communication literature. 
Noy’s (2007) work on a perceived organizational pay secrecy scale (POPS) 
provides additional evidence on the relationship between justice perceptions and pay 
communication.  His findings supported the theorized, inverse relationship of pay secrecy 
and informational justice but failed to demonstrate a relationship between POPS and 
distributive justice.  Day (2007), on the other hand, found distributive justice to be the 
most influential mediator in the relationship between pay communication and pay 
satisfaction. 
As explained earlier, there is little doubt that distributive justice is an essential 
construct in the pay communication space based on the roots in equity theory.  How 
much pay an employee receives and where it puts him or her in comparison to referent 
others (e.g., peers) is an essential driver of justice perceptions.  The results of Noy (2007) 
and Day (2007) demonstrate distributive justice is likely not a mediator, but rather a 
moderator that influences the relationship between pay communication and its outcomes. 
Employees may be influenced in their perception of whether they are compensated 
equitably, based on the amount of compensation-related information their organization 
provides.  The overarching, most important decision factor, however, is the amount of 
compensation about what the individual employee deems equitable.  Consistent with this 
finding, Marasi (2014) theorized distributive justice to be a moderator in the relationship 





procedural justice.  In this relationship, distributive justice moderates the relationship 
between informational and procedural justice and workplace deviance. 
Marasi (2014) argues, based on equity theory (Adams, 1965), that unfavorable 
referent-other comparisons result in negative distributive-justice perceptions, and, 
subsequently, feelings of anger, tension, and relative deprivation (Homans, 1961; Jaques, 
1961), feelings directly associated with workplace deviance.  Despite the arguments 
drawn from Marasi’s (2014) study, points can be made for distributive justice to 
moderate the relationship between pay communication and informational and procedural 
justice instead.  Empirical evidence from the performance-management literature 
suggests, for example, that the performance-management process is viewed as less fair 
procedurally (and informationally) when results are unfavorable to the employee, as it 
might trigger self-defense mechanisms to reconcile the discrepancy between self-image 
and rating (DeNisi & Kluger, 2000).  The evidence implies that distributive justice 
perceptions (e.g., performance ratings) have a profound impact on informational- and 
procedural-justice perceptions of the instrument as a whole. 
Apart from Marasi (2014), only Scheller and Harrison (2018) utilized a 
commitment dimension (affective commitment) as an outcome variable in the context of 
a pay communication study.  Scheller and Harrison (2018) used a between-subjects 
factorial design to test the effects of pay transparency, distributive justice, and 
informational justice on pay satisfaction and affective commitment. In a study that 
utilized case studies on an MTurk sample, participants experienced more significant 
affective commitment when pay transparency was high.  Additionally, the effects of pay 





was low vs. high.  This finding suggests that distributive and information justice could 
influence potential outcome variables of pay communication in a mediation-moderation 
fashion that Marasi and Bennett (2016) suggested in their conceptual piece.  While the 
study performed by Scheller and Harrison (2018) suffers from a few conceptual 
weaknesses (pay communication was conceptualized as a dualistic variable, conceptual 
hypotheses between transparency, justice perceptions, and the outcome variables were 
linear and direct which leads to self-fulfilling prophecies), it provides an additional point 
of evidence that the proposed model and interaction by Marasi and Bennett (2016) is 
justifiable. 
 
Situational Application and Research Questions 
 
 Before the effect of manager/employee conversations on employees can be 
hypothesized, individual conversation components need to be unpacked first.  Each 
component by itself could individually impact employees’ perceptions of fairness in 
different ways.  The manager/employee conversation can be divided into four distinct 
components:  The communication of the amount of annual merit increase (1), the 
provision of individual market-range percentages (2), the explanation of the changes to 
the compensation system (3) and the explanation of the merit – increase decision that 
combines the pay system information with individual performance throughout the year 
(4).  All of these four components have to be considered ineffective research design, even 
though only component three and four (the explanation of the changes and how well 
managers can explain their decision) seems to be firmly in scope as described earlier.  
The variables to be included can be derived from the project question in combination 





between pay-related information and organizational justice perceptions (Day, 2007; 
Marasi, 2014; Noy, 2007).  Organizational justice perceptions are firmly related to 
outcomes of organizational interest:   
 Through the manager/employee conversations, managers have the opportunity to 
influence certain employee perceptions directly.  More specifically, managers’ 
explanations of the procedures and their availability to proactively provide information 
and answering questions should directly impact employees’ perceptions of procedural 
and informational justice because they provide valuable context for how a decision is 
made, and upon what the decision is based.  Thus, employees that received a 
conversation with their manager overall should have higher perceptions of procedural and 
informational justice. 
 Hypothesis 1a: Employees who had pay conversations with their managers will 
have higher perceptions of procedural justice.   
 Hypothesis 1b: Employees who had pay conversations with their managers will 
have higher perceptions of informational justice.   
 Building on the literature of pay communication, and the intentions of the 
compensation department to release more pay-related information to employees, the 
reception of the employee compensation statement should be included in the research 
design.  The compensation statement provides information on how employees’ 
compensation relates to external market conditions.  Hence, it provides employees with 
an external point of reference to base their referent-other comparison.  Furthermore, it 
provides managers with a foundation to put their increased decision in context.  Based on 





the compensation statement itself would be expected to have a positive impact on 
procedural and informational justice perceptions.  Also, one would expect this effect to 
amplify when combined with manager/employee conversations, as it provides managers 
with the opportunity to supplement the information presented on the statement with 
further context.  Distributive justice will only be influenced in situations where 
employees received the statement and had manager/employee conversations because it is 
the application of the information on the employee’s situation in the organization that 
could influence whether employees feel fairly compensated.  Without conversations, 
employees will lack the context to make this inference.   
 Hypothesis 2a: Employees who did not have a manager conversation but received 
a compensation statement have higher perceptions of procedural justice than 
employees who did not receive anything. 
 Hypothesis 2b: Employees who did not have a manager conversation but received 
a compensation statement have higher perceptions of informational justice than 
employees who did not receive anything. 
 Hypothesis 2c: Employees who had a manager conversation AND received a 
compensation statement will show higher levels of procedural justice than 
employees who just had a conversation without receiving a statement. 
 Hypothesis 2d: Employees who had a manager conversation AND received a 
compensation statement will show higher levels of informational justice than 
employees who just had a conversation without receiving a statement. 
Managers that have better conversations should see higher levels of perceptions of 





exert the same effort or are not communicators of comparable quality.  The main 
recommended topics and best practices given to managers centers around the explanation 
of the changes to the compensation system.  Thus, being more successful relaying the 
content to employees, which for this research was defined as “higher conversation 
quality,” should positively relate to employees’ perceptions of procedural and 
informational justice.   
Employees' reactions to the conversation will, however, be influenced by the base-
pay decision itself.  Depending on the perceived individual inputs and referent-other 
comparisons, individual equity evaluations will result in a gamut of perceptions of 
distributive justice (Tekleab, Bartol, & Liu, 2005).  While managers are responsible for 
the base-pay decision, the influence they have over perceptions of distributive justice 
during the conversation itself is limited.  Hence, distributive justice was used to control 
for the effects of the decision itself on the quality of the conversation.  Employees who 
received a satisfactory decision will more likely rate the conversation quality as higher, 
while employees that received a less satisfactory decision will feel more negative about 
their conversation. 
Hypothesis 3a:  Conversation quality will be positively related to perceptions of 
procedural justice, controlling for perceptions of distributive justice. 
Hypothesis 3b:  Conversation quality will be positively related to perceptions of 
informational justice, controlling for perceptions of distributive justice. 
Organizational justice perceptions should be related to employee engagement and 






Hypothesis 4a:  Higher perceptions of organizational justice will be positively 
related to the organization’s definition of engagement. 
Hypothesis 4b:  Higher perceptions of organizational justice will be positively 
related to the organization’s definition of intent to stay. 
 
















For this organizational research, data from two surveys were used to test the 
hypotheses (see Figure 5).  Most of the data stems from an employee survey that was 
designed and conducted specifically for this research.  Information on intent to stay and 
organizational engagement was provided by the results of the enterprise-wide 
engagement survey.  Additional demographics required for specific analyses requested by 














A sample of 5000 employees was chosen for this research.  A few considerations 




While a random sample of a few hundred would have been sufficient for the 
analysis to adhere to minimum N-size recommendations, the client wanted to retain the 
capability to analyze results on the department level.  Generally, the organization consists 
mostly of one large department employing about one-third of all employees.  The 
remaining departments are smaller and varying in size.  The author decided to 
deliberately oversample to ensure that sample sizes are large enough to draw meaningful 
conclusions from the results.  The results were achieved by sampling 7500 randomly 
chosen employees across all types of responsibilities, band levels, tenure groups, etc.  
Then, about 2500 random employees from the largest department were removed from the 
sample.  As a result, the final sample of 5225 invited employees (cleaned for vice-
president or higher level of employees, attrition in the data, etc.) had a higher percentage 
of employees from smaller departments. See Table 1 for illustration. 
 Concern around the frequency of employees who indicate not having received a 
manager conversation also leads to increased sample size.  It was the expectation of the 
author as well as the compensation department that not having a conversation is an 
incredibly rare occurrence.  Thus, to make a comparison between the two groups, a 










Illustration of Sampling Technique Employed 
 
Random sample of 5000 employees by 
department   
Random sample of 7500 employees, removing 
2000 from largest department 
Department n % of total  Department n % of total % increase 
A 3250 65.00%   A (-2000) 2875 52.27% -13.04% 
B 100 2.00%   B 150 2.73% 33.33% 
C 150 3.00%   C 225 4.09% 33.33% 
D 250 5.00%   D 375 6.82% 33.33% 
E 500 10.00%   E 750 13.64% 33.33% 
F 600 12.00%   F 900 16.36% 33.33% 





 The survey timing followed a deliberate sequence.  The start date was about two 
weeks after employees should have had their conversations with their managers.  That 
would give managers enough time to conduct their conversations, but it was close 
enough, so employees were able to recall necessary details.  After seven days, 
nonresponsive employees were reminded to use their opportunity to participate. They 
were reminded again on the morning of the last day of the survey period. 
The enterprise-wide engagement survey was released a few weeks after the 
closure of the research to provide another opportunity for engagement and to help 




 In this section, the instruments used to conduct this research are described.  The 
main focus of this section will be on the employee survey that was designed explicitly for 





limitations that were faced by the author and how those limitations affected the outcomes 
of the analysis. 
Employee Survey 
 
 The employee survey consisted of 18 items divided into three sections.  The first 
section (two items) intended to measure which type of communication that had occurred 
between the manager and the employee.  Specifically, whether the employee had a 
compensation conversation with their manager (Yes/No), and whether they had been 
provided with a compensation statement (Yes/No), the newer document that 
communicates necessary individual compensation information such as base salary, 
individual market-range percentile, and base-pay increase to the employee.   
 The second section of the survey asked questions regarding the quality of the 
manager/employee conversation.  This 9-item section leaned on recommended topics and 
best practices that were provided to managers and measured the extent to which 
employees gained a good understanding of them during the conversation.  Responses 
were measured on a 5 – point Likert – scale.  Employees who indicated that they did not 
have a pay conversation with their manager did not receive this set of questions. 
 The third and final section consists of a loose adaptation of Colquitt’s (2001) 
organizational Justice Scale.  Colquitt’s organizational justice scale is a validated 
instrument that has been frequently used in organizational justice research since its 
creation.  The scale synthesizes previously created measures of all four dimensions of 
organizational justice in one scale that consists of 30 items.  Using the entire scale, 
however, was impractical in this context.  From personal experience, focus groups, and 





frequency with which they are surveyed as too high and the length of each the surveys as 
too long.  The organization strives to make better decisions by employing data whenever 
possible; this is inherently a worthwhile goal for which to strive.  Much of the data that is 
used to evaluate internal programs and processes originate from surveys administered to a 
specific subset of employees.  Not always are these surveys appropriately vetted by 
subject matter experts with psychometric training or advanced consulting skills.  The 
results are surveys that sometimes lack focus, prioritization, and quality, which 
contributes to perceived survey fatigue that manifests itself in lowered response rates. 
 In this environment, administering a 30-item scale to measure one construct with 
four subdimensions is neither feasible nor politically or practically defensible.  After a 
quick analysis by the author, two items were selected from each of the distributive, 
procedural, and informational justice subscales, rewritten for the research project, and 
submitted to the client in a first draft.  While this decision stands in contrast to 
generalized recommendations of a minimum of three items per subdimension (Hinkin, 
1995; Marsh, Hau, Balla, & Grayson, 1998), it supported the chances for approval of the 
research in the first place and prevented fatigue and response bias in an already fatigued 
organization which can be a real problem for researchers when scales become too long 
(Hinkin, 1995).  Moreover, employee perceptions in organizations can be a factor of 
many influences that cannot be isolated well, or not at all in comparison to lab studies or 
academic research that allows the researcher to control environmental factors (such as 
rewards, motivators, etc.).  Given the messiness that often accompanies research within 
organizations, administering the full scale may have provided a false sense of 





measurements per construct is not without problems, as discussed. Hence, a post-hoc 
factor analysis seemed appropriate to confirm the appropriate psychometric properties of 
the revised instrument. 
 Another reason for the post hoc confirmation of the instrument stems from the 
changes that were made to the original items to fit the situation and organizational 
language.  For example, the original scale item “Is your (outcome) justified, given your 
performance?” was changed to “To what extent was the recent decision made about your 
base pay reflective of your performance in 2018?”.  During the inception phase of this 
project, the client was made aware of the origin of the items, and that vast changes to the 
recommended items would put the efficacy of the instrument at risk.  The client displayed 
a high understanding of these limitations and chose to keep changes as minimal as 
possible.  The rating-scale anchors were revised as well.  Colquitt’s (2001) items are to 
be rated on a 5-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree to strongly agree.”  While the 
5-point scale was retained, participants rated on answer options ranging from “to a very 
small extent” to “a very large extent.”  This change allowed the author to keep anchors 
consistent across the survey, which was intended to improve the user experience for 
participants.  Different designs and scales require different amounts of interpretative 
efforts by the participant to translate their response into the response options provided by 
the instrument (DeCastellarnau, 2018).  By keeping response options consistent 
throughout the survey, the author also attempts to keep the required amount of 
interpretative effort to a minimum.   
 Post administration, reliability of each justice dimension was assessed 





procedural justice, and α = 0.863 for informational justice, indicating acceptable 
reliability (Cortina, 1993).  Given the magnitude of changes, a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) was conducted post-hoc to confirm the factor structure of the 
measurement.  A CFI value of0 0.958 and an SRMR of 0.039 indicates a good model fit 
in line with recommendations by Hu and Bentler (1999).  An RMSEA of 0.193 violates 
these guidelines and indicates at least some issues.  RMSEA has shown to be sensitive to 
sample size and simpler models with low degrees of freedom.  Since the model includes 
three factors with two items each, the degrees of freedom of six are low.  The RMSEA, 
along with the TLI, are also dependent on the chi-square value.  With a large sample size, 
higher correlations among measures, chi-square values are high (this model has a chi-
square value of 82.80).  Thus, a low ratio of items to factors and a high chi-square value 
negatively influence the RMSEA and result in poor model fit (Kenny, Kaniskan, & 
McCoach, 2015).  With the SRMR (that is not dependent on chi-square values) and the 
CFI adhering to the recommended guidelines, the data is still suitable for this study.  See 
Table 2 for a comparison between the observed goodness of fit values and Hu and 




Goodness of Fit Criteria 
 
Fit Index Cutoff Criteria* Observed Value 
CFI 0.95 0.958 
TLI 0.95 0.895 
RMSEA 0.06 0.193 
SRMR 0.08 0.039 









 The engagement survey is administered to all employees across the enterprise on 
an annual basis.  Engagement is measured with five items and is following a unique 
organization-specific definition of the construct that differs from academic definitions 
such as Kahn (1990) and Schaufeli, Salanova, González-Romá, and Bakker (2002).  
While individual items of the scale cannot be discussed due to confidentiality, it is the 
opinion of the author that items utilized seem more aligned with affective organizational 
commitment.  Relationships of the organizational definition of engagement to critical 
organizational outcomes (such as measures of productivity) have been validated 
internally in 2014 and 2019 in internal analyses. 
Additionally, intent to stay was measured with one item only.  While a one-item 
measure can be problematic because of many reasons, there is evidence that one-item 
measures may suffice when constructs are very narrowly defined (e.g., Bergkvist & 
Rossiter, 2007).  The argument can be made that intent to stay is such a narrowly defined 
construct.  The relationship of the intent to stay measurement and organizational turnover 




Additional demographics necessary for the analysis of specific client questions 
were acquired from the HR systems of record, by appending this information to the data, 
allowing for the breakout of justice perceptions by market quartiles, actual pay increase, 
departments, and other factors that aid the utility of the collected data to the client.  For 





actual pay increases grouped into nine increase groups were retained above and beyond 






Missing data is a pervasive problem in data analysis.  When data are missing at 
random, deleting, or excluding cases from the analysis is a viable solution (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2018).  Missing data were not expected to be an issue that could undermine the 
efficacy to run statistical procedures for hypothesis testing due to the large sample size.  
Data were missing at random with no observed patterns.  Thus, the decision was made to 
remove incomplete cases from the analysis.  In total, 96 cases were removed, which 
represents roughly 4.3% of all cases. 
Data Analysis 
 
Multiple different analysis techniques were utilized.  Independent-sample t-tests 
are used to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b 2c, and 2d.  Hierarchical regression was used to 
test Hypothesis 3, and linear regression was used to test Hypothesis 4.  Accordingly, 
when any individual effect is being reported, please note that it should be assumed that all 













Of 5225 invited employees, 2230 responded, which represents a response rate of 
42.7%.  Total scores were computed for distributive, procedural, and informational 
justice by the addition of the raw scores for each sub-dimension.  An exploratory analysis 
was conducted on the total justice scores to examine the normality of the distribution.  
Guidelines on limits of normality vary from the use of fixed rules of thumb (George & 
Mallery, 2016; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2018) to the use of significance testing using z-
scores (Field, 2013; Howell, 2012).  However, Field (2013) noted that significance tests 
should not be used in large samples (like this study) because they are likely to be 
significant even though distributions approach normality.  Tabachnick and Fidell (2018) 
recommend a range from + 1.5 to -1.5 for skewness and kurtosis to be considered normal.  
George and Mallery (2016) recommend a range of + 2.0 to -2.0.  Skewness and kurtosis 
for all three total scores stayed within these limits, with kurtosis of -1.15 for distributive 
justice being the most extreme value.  A visual inspection of the histograms displays a 
normal-looking distribution for procedural and informational justice with a high 
concentration of higher values at the top end of the distribution.  The distribution of 





Q-Q plots do not show any information that would lead to the conclusion that the 
distribution of normality is an issue.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests both 
returned significant, indicating non-normal solutions.  Despite these results, independent 
sample t-tests were used to assess Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d because 
these tests of normality are reactive to larger sample sizes and because t-tests are 
considered to be robust when larger samples are used (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012). 
 The absence of outliers was assessed by computing a Mahalanobis distance for 
each case, using informational and procedural justice as dependent variables, and by 
running a chi-square test on the Mahalanobis distance values to determine the p level.  
Per recommendation by Tabachnick and Fidell (2018), a critical value p < 0.001 was 
applied to create a cutoff.  Cases that violated the threshold for either procedural or 
informational justice were removed from the data.  As a result, 94 cases were removed. 
 Multicollinearity was assessed by assessing the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
for all continuous, independent variables used in this study.  Across the literature, a wide 
array of recommendations is given for acceptable VIF values, ranging from five to 15.  In 
the analysis for Multicollinearity, no VIF value exceeded 4.32.  Thus, no 
multicollinearity was detected (see Table 3).  
 Homoscedasticity was assessed by examining the residuals on a scatterplot.  From 
the observation, residuals are evenly distributed across a regression line.  Thus, it can be 







Mean, Standard Deviation and Correlations of Observed and Latent Constructs and Covariates 
 
  Variable 0M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Conversation Content                 
  1. Market Range 1 03.66 1.03 - 0.67* 0.67* 0.66* 0.54* 0.53* 0.45* 0.43* 0.40* 0.28* 0.38* 0.38* 0.20* 0.12* 
  2. Market Range 2 03.23 1.23 0.67* - 0.83* 0.71* 0.49* 0.67* 0.52* 0.55* 0.51* 0.34* 0.47* 0.49* 0.25* 0.17* 
  3. Market Range 3 03.07 1.24 0.67* 0.83* - 0.82* 0.52* 0.64* 0.52* 0.51* 0.48* 0.32* 0.44* 0.44* 0.26* 0.19* 
  4. Market Range 4 03.31 1.20 0.66* 0.71* 0.82* - 0.57* 0.58* 0.52* 0.50* 0.49* 0.37* 0.46* 0.46* 0.27* 0.15* 
  5. Total Rewards 03.76 1.22 0.54* 0.49* 0.52* 0.57* - 0.50* 0.43* 0.46* 0.40* 0.27* 0.38* 0.38* 0.22* 0.13* 
  6. Decision Factors 03.44 1.22 0.53* 0.67* 0.64* 0.58* 0.50* - 0.74* 0.72* 0.68* 0.48* 0.61* 0.64* 0.33* 0.23* 
  7. Performance 03.57 1.22 0.45* 0.52* 0.52* 0.52* 0.43* 0.74* - 0.71* 0.74* 0.63* 0.69* 0.72* 0.35* 0.24* 
  8. Ask Questions 03.77 1.17 0.43* 0.55* 0.51* 0.50* 0.46* 0.72* 0.71* - 0.79* 0.55* 0.71* 0.70* 0.34* 0.25* 
  9. Answ. Questions 03.48 1.31 0.40* 0.51* 0.48* 0.49* 0.40* 0.68* 0.74* 0.79* - 0.67* 0.76* 0.76* 0.40* 0.29* 
Covariates                 
  10. Distributive Justice 06.42 2.69 0.28* 0.34* 0.32* 0.37* 0.27* 0.48* 0.63* 0.55* 0.67* - 0.79* 0.78* 0.40* 0.30* 
Outcome Variables                 
  11. Procedural Justice 07.01 2.34 0.38* 0.47* 0.44* 0.46* 0.38* 0.61* 0.69* 0.71* 0.76* 0.79* - 0.88* 0.44* 0.23* 
  12. Informational Justice 07.24 2.42 0.38* 0.49* 0.44* 0.46* 0.38* 0.64* 0.72* 0.70* 0.76* 0.78* 0.88* - 0.42* 0.33* 
  13. Engagement 20.78 3.31 0.20* 0.25* 0.26* 0.27* 0.22* 0.33* 0.35* 0.34* 0.40* 0.40* 0.44* 0.42* - 0.66* 
  14. Intend to Stay 04.33 0.88 0.12* 0.17* 0.19* 0.15* 0.13* 0.23* 0.24* 0.25* 0.29* 0.30* 0.23* 0.33* 0.66* - 









Conversation Impact on Perceptions of Procedural  
and Informational Justice 
 
 An independent sample t-test was used to evaluate whether manager 
conversations had an impact on perceptions of procedural and informational justice.  
There was a significant difference in procedural justice perception scores between 
employees who did (M = 7.14, SD = 2.26), and did not (M = 4.01, SD = 2.11) receive an 
annual pay conversation with their manager, t (2109) = 12.99, p < .001. The equal 
variance was assumed as Leven’s test was not significant.  Effect size was found to be 
very large (d = 1.43) using Sawilowsky’s (2009) criteria (very small d = 0.1, small d = 
0.2, medium d = 0.5, large d = 0.8, very large d = 1.2, huge d = 2.0) that meaningfully 
expand Cohen’s (1988) original suggested interpretation. These results suggest that 
having a manager conversation is associated with higher perceptions of procedural 
justice.  Hypothesis 1a was supported. 
For informational justice, there was a significant difference in justice perception 
scores between employees who did (M = 7.38, SD = 2.32), and did not (M = 4.16, SD = 
2.48) receive an annual pay conversation with their manager, t (2116) = 12.90, p < .001. 
The equal variance was assumed as Leven’s test was not significant.  The effect size was 
found to be very large (d = 1.34) (Sawilowsky, 2009).  These results suggest that having 
a manager conversation is associated with higher perceptions of informational justice.  
Thus, Hypothesis 1b was supported.  
 An independent sample t-test was used to evaluate whether receiving 
compensation statements affected employees that did not have manager conversations on 
perceptions of procedural and informational justice.  There was a significant difference in 





and did not (M = 3.64, SD = 1.92) receive a compensation statement, t (89) = 2.29, p < 
0.05.  The equal variance was assumed as Levene’s test was not significant. The effect 
size was found to be moderate (d = 0.49) (Sawilowsky, 2009). These results suggest that 
just receiving a compensation statement without actually having a manager conversation 
positively influences perceptions of procedural justice (see Table 4). Thus, Hypothesis 2a 
was supported.  Effects on informational justice, however, returned nonsignificant 




N-size, Mean, Standard Deviation of Hypothesis 1 
 
Variable  Manager Conversation Yes/No n M SD 
Procedural Justice Yes 2020 7.14 2.26 
  No 0091 4.01 2.11 
          
Informational Justice Yes 2027 7.38 2.32 
  No 0091 4.16 2.48 
 
 
 An independent sample t-test was used to evaluate whether receiving 
compensation statements affected employees that had manager conversations on 
perceptions of procedural and informational justice.  There was a significant difference in 
procedural justice perception scores between employees who did (M = 7.26, SD = 2.21), 
and did not (M = 5.97, SD = 2.39) receive a compensation statement, t (2018) = 7.36, p < 
.001.  The equal variance was assumed as Leven’s test was not significant.  The effect 
size was found to be moderate (d = 0.56) (Sawilowsky, 2009).  Hypothesis 2c was 
supported. 
There was also a significant difference in informational justice perception scores 





receive a compensation statement, t (204.80) = 7.80, p < .001.  Leven’s test was 
significant, so equal variance was not assumed.  The observed effect size was found to be 
moderate (d = 0.64) (Sawilowsky, 2009).  Hypothesis 2d was supported.  Receiving a 
compensation statement while having a manager conversation does moderately influence 
perceptions of informational and procedural justice.  
 
Conversation Quality and Perceptions of Procedural  
and Informational Justice 
 
 Two two-stage hierarchical regressions were conducted to assess whether 
manager conversation quality influences perceptions of procedural and informational 
justice, controlling for distributive justice.  Conversation quality consists of nine items 
developed to reflect the recommended topics and best practices.  Distributive justice was 
entered in Step 1 as a control variable, followed by the conversation quality items in Step 
2.  Items were not aggregated since their creation was purely based on recommended 
topics and best practices provided by the compensation department and are not part of a 
validated scale. 
 For procedural justice, the hierarchical regression showed that distributive justice 
contributed significantly to the regression model (F (1, 1966) = 3192.37, p< 0.001), and 
accounted for 61.9% of the variation in perceptions of procedural justice.  Adding the 
conversation quality items to the regression explained an additional 13.4% of the 
variation. This change was significant (F (10, 1957) = 595.07, p< 0.001).  Thus, 
conversation quality positively influenced procedural justice perceptions of employees 





items returned significant.  Hypothesis 3a was supported.  See Table 5 for full regression 
results. 
For informational justice, the results of the hierarchical regression showed similar 
results.  Once again, distributive justice contributed significantly to perceptions of 
informational justice (F (1, 1971) = 2943.54, p< .001), and explained 59.9% of the 
variance.  Adding the conversation quality items added 15.0% of the explained variance.  
The increase was significant (F (10, 1962) = 585.96, p< .001).  Thus, conversation 
quality positively influenced perceptions of informational justice.  Out of the nine 
conversation items, six items returned, showing significance.  Given the results, 







Hierarchical Regression Results of Procedural Justice 
 
    
Unstandardized 
coefficients   
Standardized 
coefficients         
Step Predictor  -B SE   ß p R
2 R2 change F p 
1             .619 .619 3192.37 .000*** 
  Distributive Justice -.407 .013   -.481 .000***       
2             .751 .134 0595.07 .000*** 
  1. Market Range 1 -.001 .037   -.001 .973         
  2. Market Range 2 -.111 .040   -.060 .006**         
  3. Market Range 3 -.077 .046   -.042 .095         
  4. Market Range 4 -.049 .040   -.026 .217         
  5. Total Rewards -.048 .027   -.260 .074         
  6. Decision Factors -.019 .039   -.010 .672         
  7. Performance -.099 .038   -.053 .009**         
  8. Ask Questions -.444 .040   -.230 .000***       
  9. Answ. Questions -.302 .038   -.038 .000***       
  Outcome: Procedural Justice, N = 1967, SE = Standard Error of B. * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001 
 










Hierarchical Regression Results of Informational Justice 
 




   
Standardized 
coefficients         
Step  Predictor  B SE 
 
  ß p R
2 R2 change F p 
1              .599 .599 2943.535 .000*** 
  Distributive Justice -.379 .012    -.774 .000***       
2              .748 .150 585.960 .000*** 
  1. Market Range 1 -.180 .038    -.008 .636         
  2. Market Range 2 -.163 .041    -.086 .000***       
  3. Market Range 3 -.156 .047    -.063 .001**       
  4. Market Range 4 -.055 .041    -.028 .185        
  5. Total Rewards -.012 .028    -.006 .681         
  6. Decision Factors -.160 .040    -.084 .000***       
  7. Performance -.239 .039    -.125 .000***       
  8. Ask Questions -.294 .041    -.148 .000***       
  9. Answ. Questions -.338 .039    -.191 .000***       










Overall Perceptions of Justice and Organizational Outcomes 
 
Perceptions of distributive, procedural, and informational justice were 
aggregated into one organizational justice score by creating a sum of each item. Since 
each dimension of organizational justice was measured with two items, distributive, 
procedural, and informational justice are represented equally in the overall score.  This 
procedure was supported by evidence from the confirmatory factor analysis; after the 
inclusion of a higher-order factor to the measurement model, the fit indices did not 
change.   
Scientifically, the procedure is supported by findings from Colquitt and Shaw 
(2005). They demonstrated that each of the four justice dimensions has a strong factor 
loading when aggregated to a latent “organizational justice” construct.  While few 
studies had used organizational justice in this fashion (e.g., Liao, 2007) Fassina, Jones, 
and Uggerslev (2008) noted that such an approach would be feasible if the focus of the 
prediction is on the shared justice variance in an outcome, as it is the case for 
Hypothesis 4 (Colquitt, 2012)  
Linear regression was conducted to investigate the relationship between 
perceptions of organizational justice and the organizational engagement variable as 
defined by the company.  The regression was significant (F (1, 1788) = 443.88, 
p< .001). Overall, perceptions of organizational justice explained 19.8% of the variance 
in engagement.  Hypothesis 4a was supported. 
 Additionally, a linear regression was used to examine the relationship between 





(F (1, 1788) = 238.99, p< .001). Overall, perceptions of organizational justice explained 













Results empirically showed that manager/employee pay conversations are a useful 
tool to positively influence employees’ perceptions about the base-pay increase process 
and the information they receive.  Perceptions of informational and procedural justice of 
employees without a conversation was substantially lower, as demonstrated by the large 
effect size.  The number of employees without a conversation was small, with roughly 
5% being affected, but it still seems like a missed opportunity that warrants a closer look.  
One potential explanation for managers not having a conversation with their employees 
could be the avoidance of having to communicate negative news, or not seeing the need 
to have a conversation if the pay does not change at all.   
Actual pay increases, expressed in percentile, were formed into nine groups to 
evaluate this hypothesis; Group 1 received little to no increase, and Group 9 received 
more than a 5% increase.  The distribution revealed that for employees without a 
conversation, 41.1% received either no or very little pay increase while the percentage is 
20.4% for employees that had a conversation.  The finding provides further support for 
the hypothesis that some managers either avoid or do not see the need to have a 




cannot be excluded from the evidence presented.  It is also possible that managers were 
unable to schedule time, had employees on leave of absences, or that other circumstances 
prevented a conversation.  In those cases, we would expect the distribution across pay-
increase groups to be approaching the distribution of the overall population.  The fact that 
the group that makes for the least desirable conversation is heavily over-represented 
speaks to a non-random component within the data. The evidence of this study suggests 
that not having a manager-/employee conversation is a missed opportunity:  When the 
data is filtered for employees in increase Group 1, only t-tests still reveal a significant, 
strong effect for procedural justice (d = 1.02) and informational justice (d = 0.89).  Thus, 
managers should have a pay conversation even when the decision itself is unfavorable for 
the employee. 
Another important client question centers around recommended talking points and 
best practices that are provided to managers, and whether those items are useful in 
influencing employees’ perceptions.  For procedural justice, only four out of nine 
recommended topics & best practices were significant in influencing employees’ 
perceptions.  Specifically, whether employees were able to ask questions and whether 
those questions were answered satisfactorily had the most significant impact, followed by 
the explanation of how individual performance factored into the ultimate base-pay 
decision.  Recommended topics and best practices that aimed at explaining the new 
changes and guardrails of the compensation system to employees were mostly 
nonsignificant. Only the explanation of the new market-range metric, which was also part 
of the compensation statement, was significant.  From a procedural justice perspective, 





procedural justice are involvement in the decision-making, consistency of procedures, 
and bias suppression (Colquitt et al., 2001).  While involvement in the decision-making is 
relatively unlikely, having the opportunity to ask questions and having these questions 
answered clarifies the procedure and provides the employee with the relevant information 
to decide whether consistency and unbiased decision-making occurred.  Additionally, it 
provides an opportunity to the employee to voice his or her feelings of the decision, 
which fosters acceptance of the process which is the 4th of the six Leventhal criteria 
(Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980) for procedures to be perceived as fair. 
 For informational justice, six out of nine recommended topics and best practices 
were significant.  Similar to procedural justice, asking questions, and having questions 
answered satisfactorily were the strongest predictors, followed by understanding how 
individual performance factored into the base-pay decision.  Additionally, having all the 
factors that went into the base-pay decision explained was a significant predictor as well 
as the explanation of market ranges. This new information also appears on the 
compensation statement.  One item, self-evaluation of the understanding of the concept of 
market ranges, was a significant negative predictor.  While a possible explanation could 
be that understanding the metric well could potentially raise more questions about its 
computations, which introduces more awareness of potential shortcomings, it is more 
likely that this could be a sign of a suppression effect (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2018).  A 
simple correlation between this item and procedural justice was positive and thus in 
direct conflict to the results from the regression. 
 From a statistical perspective, using nine predictors in the same step of a 





suppression effect where some predictors suppress variance that is otherwise unrelated to 
the dependent variable.  One indicator of a suppression effect is a sign of a regression 
weight of a predictor that is the opposite of what one would expect (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2018).  Such indicators are observed in Predictor 1 for procedural justice, and Predictor 1 
and 3 for informational justice, although correlations for both variables with the outcome 
are positive.  Additionally, Predictor 3 is significant for procedural justice.  To 
appropriately address the concern, all recommended topics, and best practices around 
market ranges were aggregated to one factor.  This aggregation seems justifiable since the 
aggregated variables stem from the same content space.  Reliability analysis revealed that 
Cronbach alphas for these four variables were quite good (α = 0.915).  On top, 
confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess whether variables indeed tab into the 
same content space.  The goodness of fit indices were all within the recommended ranges 
for Hu and Bentler (1999), except for the RMSEA for issues already discussed (CFI = 
.985, TLI = .955, SRMR = .020, RMSEA = .142). Thus, the regression analysis was 
rerun with this aggregated predictor, limiting the numbers of predictors added in Step 2 
from nine to five.  The overall results of the regression did not change.  For individual 
predictors, the new combined market range variable was significant for procedural justice 
(p< 0.05) with beta weights that were quite small (B = 0.020; ß = 0.037). While small 
effects can have a significant impact in a large organization, this result should be 
interpreted with caution because a p-value of just below 0.05 with ample statistical power 






For informational justice, the new aggregated market range variable was not 
significant.  The reason this approach was not chosen for the primary analysis if the study 
is connected to client reporting concerns.  This research aimed at providing the client 
with a comprehensive picture of which recommended topics and best practices support 
the goal of positively influencing employee’s fairness perceptions of the process.  
Reporting back to the client on an aggregated predictor is potentially more ambiguous to 
report, to explain, and potentially raises more questions, so the approach with nine 
predictors was chosen.  
Similar concerns also influenced a different research-design decision of this 
study.  Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d were analyzed using several independent t-tests.  In 
psychological research, a MANOVA would be more appropriate in this situation.  Due to 
the complexity of conducting and reporting a MANOVA, specifically in the 
organizational context, the approach, as mentioned above, was chosen.  However, a 
MANOVA offers greater statistical power over multiple independent t-tests, so the 
decision was made to re-evaluate results from Hypothesis 2 using the more sophisticated 
statistical analysis.  Results of the two-way MANOVA showed a significant effect on 
manager conversations on procedural and informational justice (see Table 7).  The effects 
of the compensation statement were nonsignificant.  The interaction effect of the manager 
conversation and the compensation statement was nonsignificant as well.  The likely 
conclusion is that the compensation statement does not add positively to the perceptions 
of procedural and informational justice above and beyond the manager/employee 
conversation.  Post-hoc two-way ANOVAs reveal that the results do not differ for 





results as definitive; however, as the sample size for some of the combinations of 
independent variables is an issue. For example, only 34 employees in the sample received 
a compensation statement without receiving a manager conversation.  Given the 
observable difference in mean scores demonstrated for Hypothesis 2, the nonsignificant 
interaction effect of the MANOVA may be a product of low statistical power.  An 
evaluation using GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang; 2009) for post-hoc 
MANOVA analysis given an error probability of α = 0.05 revealed a statistical power of 
ß = 0.32, well below the required threshold of 0.80 recommended by Cohen (1992), 
confirming inadequate sample size.  Thus, the role of the compensation statement cannot 






Predictor λ Hypothesis df Error df F Sig.  
Intercept 0.925 2 2098 84.769 0.000* 
Conversation_1_0 0.977 2 2098 24.205 0.000* 











 Based on this research, a handful of recommendations were made to the 
compensation department.  First, we have demonstrated that not having a pay 
conversation is a lost opportunity to soften the effects of unfavorable pay decisions.  
Managers who avoid the conversation are not behaving in the best interest of the 





practices.  Given the damaging effects of not explaining decisions and practices to 
employees on organizational engagement and intent to stay, managers need to go out of 
their way to make these conversations happen.  Additionally, the study demonstrated that 
investing energy and effort into the conversations is worthwhile to boost perceptions even 
further. 
 The latest guidelines recommended that managers should focus a reasonable 
amount of time explaining the changes to the compensation guardrails to employees more 
carefully.  As already explained, most of these recommended topics and best practices 
have shown to be ineffective in improving employees’ perceptions of procedural and 
informational justice, and thus, making these topics the main focus point does not seem 
the most effective strategy.  Instead, it was recommended that managers summarize the 
pay-increase system but shift quickly to focus the conversation on explaining the 
employee’s contributions and how they influenced their decision.  Additionally, ample 
time should be given to the employee to ask questions to make sure everything is 
adequately explained.  However, managers need to be prepared to explain the base-pay-
increase system in detail when being asked by the employee.   
 The role of compensation statements as a strategy to elevate employee’s 
perceptions of informational justice couldn’t be illuminated conclusively.  There are 
indicators that statements may have a small to medium positive effect on procedural and 
informational justice perceptions at best or don’t contribute anything at worst.  Thus, 
there is no harm in continuing the practice, primarily since statements are automatically 
generated.  As described, there is no consensus in the pay communication literature on 





organization’s workforce (Colella et al., 2007).  Some of the initial evidence gathered in 
this study seems to indicate that a moderate increase in transparency may result in more 
beneficial perceptions of informational justice, even though this statement cannot be 




 The results of this study provided the foundation for follow up research that aided 
the understanding of employee reactions to the annual pay-increase process.  For 
example, detailed results by demographic and organizational variables were provided to 
the compensation department that enabled them to understand how specific groups that 
were more affected by the changes to the pay increase responded and whether their 
responses indeed lead to an increase in turnover.  On a more general note, this research 
proved to the organization that there is value in using the science-practitioner model to 




 The first limitation of the study concerns the measurement of organizational 
justice.  Colquitt (2001) constructed the most widely used scale of organizational justice 
totaling 16 items to measure distributive, procedural, and informational justice.  For 
reasons explained, the present study only uses two items per factor, thus, deviating 
substantially from the original instrument.  As a consequence, perceptions of distributive, 
procedural, and informational justice are not fully captured from a scientific perspective.  
The most obvious case is procedural justice.  As discussed, Leventhal (1980) created six 





research, only two out of these six criteria were captured in the instrument (accurate 
information, and opportunity to express views and feelings), leaving four criteria 
unmeasured.  Relative statements regarding employees’ perception (e.g., whether they 
experience an increase, decrease) can be drawn from the research.  However, the measure 
is deficient in making absolute statements on the base-pay-increase process overall.  The 
same, albeit less severe, limitations apply to results for informational and distributive 
justice.  The latter factor is the least affected by these limitations for several reasons.  
First, the original scale only consists of four items, which makes it the shortest subscale.  
Second, Colquitt’s (2001) confirmatory factor analysis showed that three of the four 
items have very high, similar factor loadings.  From these three items, one was included 
in our survey together with the fourth item from the original scale that seems to function 
a bit differently from the other three.  Thus, confidence can be had that the two selected 
items cover a reasonable amount of variance of the full construct. 
 The second limitation concerns the common method bias for Hypotheses 1 to 3.  
Common-method bias refers to measurement error that is caused by common-method 
variance, that is, variance attributable to the measurement of the constructs rather than the 
constructs themselves (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  Results for 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 may be influenced by this type of bias since they originate from the 
same survey. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values during data preparation showed that 
multicollinearity assumptions were met within reasonable thresholds. That alone is not 
enough to exclude the presence of common method bias, a cause of error that is difficult 
to control for outside of the research design itself (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  As a result, 





observable in the discussion of the value of compensation statements (Hypothesis 2), and 
the role of market range talking points (Hypothesis 3).   
 Another limitation of the study is the measure of the organizational outcome, 
engagement.  The organization’s definition of work engagement differs substantially 
from suggested definitions provided by the literature (e.g., Kahn, 1990; Macey & 
Schneider, 2008; Schaufeli et al., 2002).  The scale that is used to assess this unique 
definition of engagement has some material weaknesses such as inconsistent factor 
loadings, one-item measures for sub-criteria, and lack of variance for some items, among 
others.  These conceptual and practical deficiencies undermine the capability to detect 
consistent relationships between concepts that should otherwise be (theoretically) related 




The purpose of this project was to determine whether manager/employee pay 
conversations are effective in influencing employee’s perceptions of procedural and 
informational justice.  The evidence gathered in this study provided substantial support 
for the effectiveness of the practice and yielded particular conversation content 
recommendations that support the practice and effort to improve pay conversations in the 
organization continuously.  Additionally, the importance of good pay conversations has 
been demonstrated by linking justice perceptions to organizational outcomes such as 
engagement and intent to stay.  However, the topic of drivers of successful pay 
conversations has not been explored to a full extent yet.  Future research can expand by 
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